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2 School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University
Abstract. In data publishing, the owner delegates the role of satisfy-
ing user queries to a third-party publisher. As the publisher may be un-
trusted or susceptible to attacks, it could produce incorrect query results.
This paper introduces a mechanism for users to verify that their query
answers on a multi-dimensional dataset are correct, in the sense of being
complete (i.e., no qualifying data points are omitted) and authentic (i.e.,
all the result values originated from the owner). Our approach is to add
authentication information into a spatial data structure, by constructing
certiﬁed chains on the points within each partition, as well as on all the
partitions in the data space. Given a query, we generate proof that every
data point within those intervals of the certiﬁed chains that overlap the
query window either is returned as a result value, or fails to meet some
query condition. We study two instantiations of the approach: Veriﬁable
KD-tree (VKDtree) that is based on space partitioning, and Veriﬁable
R-tree (VRtree) that is based on data partitioning. The schemes are eval-
uated on window queries, and results show that VRtree is highly precise,
meaning that few data points outside of a query result are disclosed in
the course of proving its correctness.
1 Introduction
In data publishing, a data owner delegates the role of satisfying user queries 
to a third-party publisher [6,10]. This model is applicable to a wide range of 
computing platforms, including database caching [8], content delivery network 
[23], edge computing [9], P2P databases [7], etc.
The data publishing model oﬀers a number of advantages over conventional 
client-server architecture where the owner also undertakes the processing of user 
queries. By pushing application logic and data processing from the owner’s data 
center out to multiple publisher servers situated near user clusters, network la-
tency can be reduced. Adding publisher servers is also likely to be a cheaper 
way to achieve scalability than fortifying the owner’s data center and provision-
ing more network bandwidth for every user. Finally, the data publishing model 
removes the single point of failure in the owner’s data center, hence reducing 
the database’s susceptibility to denial of service attacks and improving service 
availability.
However, since the publishers are outside of the administrative domain of the 
data owner, and in fact may reside on poorly secured platforms, the query results
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that they generate cannot be accepted at face value, especially where they are
used as basis for critical decisions. Instead, there must be provisions for the user
to check the “correctness” of a query answer.
r1
r2
r3
r4
r5
r6
r7
r8 r9
r10
r11
r12
r13
r14
r15
r16
r17
r18
r19
r20
Q
xmin xmax
ymin
ymax
Schema:
[ id, x-coord, y-coord, user-name, account#, … ]
Data:
Fig. 1. Running Example
Consider a dataset containing 20 data points in two-dimensional space as shown
in Figure 1. The ﬁgure also includes a window query Q, for which {r13, r14} is
the correct result. A rogue publisher may return a wrong result {r13, r14, r100},
which includes a spurious point r100, or {r13∗, r14} in which some attribute values
of r13 have been tampered with. To detect such incorrect values, the user should
be able to verify the authenticity of query result. A diﬀerent threat is that the
publisher may omit some result points, for example by returning only {r13} for
query Q. This threat relates to the completeness of query result.
Most of the existing works provide for checking the authenticity [11,16] and
completeness [6,15] of query results on one-dimensional datasets. The exception
is Devanbu’s scheme [6] which handles multiple key attributes by essentially con-
catenating them in some preferred order key1|key2|..|keyd. However, the scheme
is expected to be very ineﬃcient for symmetric queries, such as window and
nearest neighbor queries, that are typical in multi-dimensional context.
In this paper, we propose a mechanism for users to verify that their query re-
sults on a multi-dimensional dataset are authentic and complete. Our approach is
to build authentication information into a spatial data structure, by construct-
ing certiﬁed chains on the points within each partition, as well as on all the
partitions in the data space. We introduce two schemes based on this approach.
The ﬁrst, the Veriﬁable KD-tree (VKDtree), is based on the space partitioning
k-d tree. The second, the Veriﬁable R-tree (VRtree), employs data partitioning
and is based on the R-tree. The schemes are evaluated on window queries, and
results show that VRtree is highly precise, meaning that few data points outside
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of a query result are disclosed in the course of proving its correctness. Moreover,
both schemes are computationally secure, and incur low processing and update
overheads. To the best of our knowledge, the authentication mechanism intro-
duced in this paper is the ﬁrst that enables a user to verify the completeness of
a multi-dimensional query result generated by an untrusted server.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the
background on data publishing model and the associated threats, and describes
some cryptographic primitives. Our authentication schemes are introduced in
Sections 3 and 4, while Section 5 presents results from a performance study.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Background
In this section, we ﬁrst present the target system deployment model and the
associated security threats. Next, we deﬁne some cryptographic primitives that
are used in our solution.
2.1 System and Threat Models
Figure 2 depicts the data publishing model, which supports three distinct roles:
– The data owner maintains a master database, and distributes it with one or
more associated signatures that prove the authenticity of the database. Any
data that has a matching signature is accepted by the user to be trustworthy.
– The publisher hosts the database, and executes queries on behalf of the
owner. There could be several publisher servers that are situated at the edge
of the network, near the user applications. The publisher is not required to
be trusted, so the query results that it generates must be accompanied by
some “correctness proof”, derived from the database and signatures issued
by the owner.
– The user issues queries to the publisher explicitly, or else gets redirected to
the publisher, e.g. by the owner or a directory service. To verify the signatures
in the query results, the user obtains the public key of the owner through an
authenticated channel, such as a public key certiﬁcate issued by a certiﬁcate
authority.
User
Owner Publisher
query
result +
correctness
proof
data +
signatures
public
key
Fig. 2. Data Publishing Model
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Our primary concern addressed in this paper is the threat that a dishonest
publisher may return incorrect query results to the users, whether intentionally
or under the inﬂuence of an adversary. An adversary who is cognizant of the data
organization in the publisher server may make logical alterations to the data,
thus inducing incorrect query results. Even if the data organization is hidden,
for example through data encryption or steganographic schemes (e.g., [17]), the
adversary may still sabotage the database by overwriting physical pages within
the storage volume. In addition, a compromised publisher server could be made
to return incomplete query results by withholding data intentionally. Therefore
mechanisms for users to verify the completeness as well as authenticity of their
query results are essential for the data publishing model. While there are several
other security considerations in the data publishing model (such as privacy, user
authentication and access control), these have been studied extensively (e.g. [1],
[17], [12], [22]), and are orthogonal to our work here.
2.2 Cryptographic Primitives
Our proposed solution and many of the related work are based on the following
cryptographic primitives:
One-way hash function: A one-way hash function, denoted as h(.), is a hash
function that works in one direction: it is easy to compute a ﬁxed-length digest
h(m) from a variable-length pre-image m; however, it is hard to ﬁnd a pre-image
that hashes to a given hash value. Examples include MD5 [18] and SHA [3]. We
will use the terms hash, hash value and digest interchangeably.
Digital signature: A digital signature algorithm is a cryptographic tool for
authenticating the integrity and origin of a signed message. In the algorithm,
the signer uses a private key to generate digital signatures on messages, while
a corresponding public key is used by anyone to verify the signatures. RSA [19]
and DSA [2] are two commonly-used signature algorithms.
Signature aggregation: As introduced in [5], this is a multi-signer scheme
that aggregates signatures generated by distinct signers on diﬀerent messages
into one signature. Signing a message m involves computing the message hash
h(m) and then the signature on the hash value. To aggregate t signatures, one
simply multiplies the individual signatures, so the aggregated signature has the
same size as each individual signature. Veriﬁcation of an aggregated signature
involves computing the product of all message hashes and then matching with
the aggregated signature.
Signature chain: In [15], a signature chain scheme is proposed that enables
clients to verify the completeness of answers of range queries. A very nice prop-
erty of the scheme is that only result values are returned, thus ensuring that
there is no violation of access control. The scheme is based on two concepts:
(a) The signature of a record is derived from its own digest as well as its left and
right neighbors’. In this way, an attempt to drop any value from the answer of
64 W. Cheng, H. Pang, and K.-L. Tan
a range query will be detected since it would no longer be possible to derive the
correct signature for the record that depends on the dropped value. (b) For the
boundaries of the answer, a collaborative scheme that involves both the pub-
lisher and the client is proposed – the publisher performs partial computation
based on but not revealing the two records bounding the answer and the query
range, while the client completes the computation based on the two end points
of the query range.
3 Signature Chain in Multi-dimensional Space
The goal of our work is to devise a solution for checking the correctness of query
answers on multi-dimensional datasets. The design objectives include:
– Completeness: The user can verify that all the data points that satisfy a
window query are included in the answer.
– Authenticity: The user can check that all the values in a query answer orig-
inated from the data owner. They have not been tampered with, nor have
spurious data points been introduced.
– Precision: Proving the correctness of a query answer entails minimal disclo-
sure of data points that lie beyond the query window. We deﬁne precision
as the ratio of the number of data points within the query window, to the
number of data points returned to the user.
– Security: It is computationally infeasible for the publisher to cheat by gen-
erating a valid proof for an incorrect query answer.
– Eﬃciency: The procedure for the publisher to generate the proof for a query
answer has polynomial complexity. Likewise the procedure for the user to
check the proof has polynomial complexity.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the data in the multi-dimensional
space are split into partitions – this can be done using a spatial data structure.
To ensure that the answer for a window query is complete, two issues must be
addressed. First, we need to prove that the answer covers all the partitions that
overlap the query window. We refer to these partitions as candidate partitions.
Second, we need to prove that all qualifying values within each candidate par-
tition are returned. The ﬁrst issue is dependent on the partitioning strategy
adopted, and is deferred to Section 4. In the rest of this section, we shall focus
on the second issue.
Assuming we have proven that the query answer covers all the candidate
partitions, we now need to ensure that all the qualifying values in those partitions
have not been dropped. Consider a candidate partition P for the window query
Q = [(ql1, ql2, . . . , qld), (qu1, qu2, . . . , qud)]. There are three possible cases: (a) Q
contains P . Since the window query bounds the partition, we need to ensure that
all the points in P are returned. (b) P contains Q. The query window is within
the space covered by the partition. A naive solution is to return all the points
in P . A better solution, which we advocate, is to return only those points that
are necessary for users to check for completeness. In both cases, our concern is
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to ensure the secrecy of points that are outside Q. (c) P overlaps Q. This case
can be handled by splitting P into two parts: the part of P that contains Q, and
the part of P that does not overlap Q. The former is handled in case (b), while
nothing needs to be done for the latter. Thus, we shall focus on cases (a) and
(b), and not discuss case (c) any further.
Our solution extends the signature chain concept in [15] to multi-dimensional
space. This is done by ordering the points within the partition, and then con-
structing the signature chain. In this paper, we adopt a simple scheme of order-
ing the points based on increasing (x1, x2, . . . , xd) value. In 2-d space, (x1, y1)
is ordered before (x2, y2) if x1 < x2, or x1 = x2 and y1 < y2. Based on this
ordering, we need to return all the points whose ﬁrst dimension is within the
range [ql1, qu1], as well as the bounding points. Of course, some of these points
may fall beyond the query window along the second dimension. For such points
that should not be part of the answer, we return only their digests rather than
the actual values, in order to protect their secrecy and achieve high precision.
We choose this simple ordering scheme over more sophisticated space ﬁlling
curves [20] because: (a) A partition (corresponding to a 4K or 8K block/page)
typically consists of a small number of points (100-200). Moreover, the actual
number of points within a partition would be smaller than the maximum capacity
(since the page is typically not full). As such, it may not be worthwhile to employ
a complicated scheme. (b) None of the existing space ﬁlling curves perform well
in all cases. Thus, they really oﬀer no signiﬁcant advantage over the simple
scheme (especially given the small number of points).
For the example in ﬁgure 1, assuming that the entire space corresponds to
one partition, the points would be ordered from r1 to r20. For case (a) where the
query bounds the partition, r1 to r20 would be returned; for case (b) where the
query (i.e., the box that bounds r13 and r14) is within the partition, we return
the values of r13 and r14 and the digest of the various dimensions for r11, r12,
r15, r16 and r17. We now present the details of our solution that extends the
signature chain scheme to multi-dimensional setting.
Construction: Let L = (L1, L2, . . . , Ld) and U = (U1, U2, . . . , Ud) be two points
that bound the entire data space, where Lr ≤ Ur for all r. L and U are known to
all users. Consider a partition P bounded by two points p0 = (x01, x02, . . . , x0d)
and pk+1 = (x(k+1),1, x(k+1),2, . . . , x(k+1),d) where x0r ≤ x(k+1),r for all r. Sup-
pose P contains k data points p1=(x11, x12, . . . , x1d), . . . pk =(xk1, xk2, . . . , xkd).
Without loss of generality, we assume that pi is ordered before pj for 1 ≤ i <
j ≤ k. Clearly, p0 is ordered before p1 and pk+1 is ordered after pk.
Our multi-dimensional signature chain constructs for each point within P an
associated signature (based on [15]):
sig(pi) = s(h(g(pi−1)|g(pi)|g(pi+1))) (1)
where s is a signature function using the owner’s private key, h is a one-way hash
function, and | denotes concatenation. g(pi) is a function to produce a digest for
point pi:
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g(pi) =
d∑
r=1
hUr−xir−1(xir)|hxir−Lr−1(xir) (2)
where hj(xir) = hj−1(h(xir)) and h0(xir) applies a one-way hash function
on x.1
Moreover, for the two delimiters,
sig(p0) = s(h(h(L1| . . . |Ld)|g(p0)|g(p1))) (3)
sig(pk+1) = s(h(g(pk)|g(pk+1)|h(U1| . . . |Ud))) (4)
In addition, each partition P has an associated signature:
sig(P ) = s(h(g(p0)|g(pk+1)|h(k))) (5)
Query Processing: Assuming that a partition P is returned. We have to prove
that all the data points within P that fall within the query window Q are re-
turned.
Case (a): Q contains P . The veriﬁcation process for this case is straightfor-
ward. The publisher server returns p0 to pk+1, and k, together with the respective
signatures sig(p0) to sig(pk+1) and sig(P ). (To reduce traﬃc overhead, we could
send just one combined signature instead of the individual signatures, using the
signature aggregation technique in [5].) The user ﬁrst veriﬁes that
s−1(sig(P )) = h(g(p0)|g(pk+1)|h(k))
Then, for each pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the user veriﬁes that pi is indeed in P (by checking
that P bounds pi). Finally, for each pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the user computes its digest
and checks whether
s−1(sig(pi)) = h(g(pi−1)|g(pi)|g(pi+1))
If all the above checks are successful, the answer contains all the data points
in P .
Case (b): P contains Q. Let pi = (xi1, xi2, . . . , xid). The data points in P
can be separated into: (a) pα, pα+1, . . . , pβ−1, pβ such that xi1 ∈ [ql1, qu1] for
α ≤ i ≤ β. These points can be further categorized into answer points (A) and
false positives (F). For each answer point pi ∈ A, ∀r xir ∈ [qlr, qur], whereas
for each false positive pi ∈ F , ∃r xir /∈ [qlr, qur]. (b) p1, . . . , pα−1, pβ+1, . . . , pk,
which are clearly not answer points.
1 To achieve tighter security, h0(xir) can be redeﬁned as h0(xir|rand(pi)) where
rand(pi) is a random number associated with pi; in which case we will need to supply
the corresponding rand(pi) with each returned record. For ease of presentation, we
shall adopt the simpler deﬁnition of h0(xir).
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(i) For each point pi ∈ A, the server returns pi and sig(pi).
(ii) For each point pi ∈ F ∪ {pα−1, pβ+1}, the server returns several pieces of
information: (i) if xir ∈ [qlr, qur], hUr−xir−1(xir)|hxir−Lr−1(xir) is returned;
(ii) if xir < qlr , hqur−xir−1(xir) and hxir−Lr−1(xir) are returned; (iii) if
xir > qur, hUr−xir−1(xir) and hxir−qlr−1(xir) are returned.
(iii) The server also returns p0, pk+1, k, sig(p0), sig(pk+1) and sig(P ).
With information from step (ii), the user can compute g(pi) without knowing
the actual value of pi:
– If xir < qlr, the user applies h on (hqur−xir−1(xir)) (Ur − qur) times to get
(hUr−xir−1(xir)).
– If xir > qur, the user applies h on (hxir−qlr−1(xir)) (qlr − Lr) times to get
(hxir−Lr−1(xir)).
– The user computes g(pi) using Equation (2).
The above procedure is secure against cheating by the publisher provided hi(p)
for i < 0 is either undeﬁned or computationally infeasible to derive. We use an
iterative hash function for hi(p), because there is no known algebraic function
that satisﬁes the requirement. To ensure that h−1(p) = p, a hash function is
chosen that outputs a diﬀerent digest length from the length of p.
Similar to case (a), the user veriﬁes the completeness of the query answer as
follows:
– Verify that the bounding box is correct using information from step (iii),
and determine whether s−1(sig(P )) = h(g(p0)|g(pk+1)|h(k)).
– Verify that each point p in A is in P by checking that p is bounded by P .
– Verify that each point pi ∈ A is authentic using information in step (ii) and
the derived information to check s−1(sig(pi)) = h(g(pi−1)|g(pi)|g(pi+1)).
Again, any attempt by the publisher server to cheat would lead to an unsuccessful
match in at least one of the above cases.
Finally, we emphasize that extra data points that are returned for proving
completeness are in the form of digests. Thus only the existence of the data
points are revealed, but not their actual content. 2
4 Verifying the Data Partitions
Having shown how to prove that all qualifying data points in a candidate parti-
tion (that overlaps the query window) are returned correctly, we now look at the
ﬁrst issue of verifying that the query answer covers all the candidate partitions.
A naive solution is to treat the entire data space as a single large partition,
so that the mechanism described in Section 3 alone suﬃces. However, we expect
this solution to have poor precision.
2 If a non-answer pi ∈ F has the same coordinate as an answer point pj ∈ A along
some dimension, both points will have the same digest for that dimension and pi’s co-
ordinate will be revealed. This can be overcome by simply adopting h0(xir|rand(pi))
as explained in footnote 1.
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Fig. 3. Partitioning Strategies
To achieve high precision, we adopt partition-based strategies so that only
those partitions that contain some qualifying data points need to be considered
for a query. In this way, any potential information leakage is limited to only
those partitions that contribute to the query answer, rather than across the
entire data space. We present our solution based on two partitioning techniques
(see Figure 3): space partitioning and data partitioning.
4.1 Space Partitioning
With space partitioning schemes, the partitions are disjoint but their union cov-
ers the entire data space. As such, all we need to do is to verify that the bounding
boxes of the returned partitions are correct, and that the union of these parti-
tions covers the query scope. The former has already been addressed in Section 3,
while the latter is just a simple check on the partition boundaries.
To illustrate, Figure 3(a) shows the data space being partitioned through a
k-d tree [4]. In the ﬁgure, the window of the query Q overlaps three partitions,
so only data from these three partitions are returned in the answer.
Besides the k-d tree, other spatial indexing techniques like the grid ﬁle [13]
and quadtree [21] can also be employed to help the publisher to locate the
candidate partitions quickly. Our authentication mechanism entails no changes
to the spatial data structures. (As we shall see shortly, this is not the case for
data partitioning schemes.)
4.2 Data Partitioning
With data partitioning approach (e.g., R-tree), the union of all the partitions
may not cover the entire data space. Thus, space that contains no data points
may not be covered by any partition, as illustrated in Figure 3(b). The existence
of empty space poses a challenge to verifying the completeness of query answers:
How does the user know that portions of a query window that are not covered by
any returned partitions indeed are empty spaces, without physically examining
all the partitions? Referring to Figure 3(b), how can the user be sure that Q
only intersects boxes B4 and B6 and not the other partitions?
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Our solution is to extend the signature chain concept to the partitions. Speciﬁ-
cally, we order the partitions by their starting boundaries along a selected dimen-
sion (as is done for point data), then chain the partitions so that the signature
of a partition is dependent on the neighboring partitions to its left and right.
Let the bounding box of the ith partition be demarcated by [l, u] where l =
(li1, li2, . . . , lid), and u = (ui1, ui2, . . . , uid). Each partition Pi has an associated
signature (based on signature chaining):
sig(Pi) = s(h(g(Pi−1)|g(Pi)|g(Pi+1))) (6)
where Pi−1 and Pi+1 are the left and right sibling partitions of Pi, and g(Pi) is
deﬁned as follows:
g(Pi) = h(h(li1| . . . |lid)|h(ui1| . . . |uid)|h(ki)) (7)
where ki is the number of points within Pi.
In addition, we deﬁne two ﬁctitious partitions as delimiters. This is similar to
what we did in building the signature chain for data points in Section 3, so we
shall not elaborate further.
During query processing, all the partition information along with their signa-
tures are returned as part of the query answer. The user can be certain that no
partition is omitted, otherwise some signatures will not match. For those parti-
tions that overlap the query window, the user then proceeds to check their data
points using the mechanism in Section 3. The remaining partitions that do not
intersect the query window are dropped from further consideration.
To minimize the extra partitions that are disclosed to the user, and to re-
duce performance overheads, we apply a hierarchical data partitioning indexing
structure like the R-tree on the data. The partitions within each internal node of
the R-tree are chained as described above. Given a window query, the publisher
server iteratively expands the child nodes corresponding to those candidate par-
titions in the current node, starting from the root down to the leaf nodes. All
the partition information and signatures along the path of traversal are added
to the query answer for user veriﬁcation.
5 A Performance Study
In this section, we report results of an experimental study conducted to evaluate
the eﬀectiveness of our authentication mechanisms, which we have implemented
in Java. We study three schemes: Veriﬁable KDtree (VKDtree) scheme that is
based on space partitioning using the k-d tree; Veriﬁable Rtree (VRtree) scheme
that is based on data partitioning using the R-tree; and Z-ordering scheme which
employs Z-ordering [14] on the entire data space (as a single partition). The
performance metric is the precision of query answers. Again, a low precision
reveals the existence of extra data points and incurs traﬃc overhead, but not
the actual content of those data points.
Unless stated otherwise, the following default parameter settings are used:
the number of dimensions is 4, the data distribution is Gaussian, the number
of data points is 1, 000, 000. The domain of each dimension is [1, 10M]. The
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node capacity is 50 (i.e., each node holds up to 50 data points). Queries are
generated by picking a point randomly from the dataset, then marking out the
query window with the chosen point as center. The length of the query window
along each dimension is l × domain size; by default, l is set to 0.1. For each
experiment, we run 500 queries, and take the average precision.
5.1 Eﬀect of Number of Dimensions
We ﬁrst vary the number of dimensions from 2 to 5. The results are summarized
in Figure 4(a). As expected, as the number of dimensions increases, all the
schemes lose precision, because more non-answer points must be provided to
verify the completeness of the query answers.
We also observe that the VKDtree scheme performs well for two-dimensional
space, but its precision drops dramatically at higher dimensions. This is because
more partitions are returned as a result of their overlapping the query window.
The result for Z-ordering is, surprisingly, similar to the VKDtree scheme. In fact,
it even performs better than VKDtree in some cases. Investigation shows that
this is because the coverage of the partitions returned under VKDtree may be
larger than the region covered by the Z-ordering scheme. Finally, the VRtree
scheme achieves precisions of at least 60%, is least aﬀected by dimensionality,
and appears to perform the best overall. This is because the data partitioning
scheme is able to eﬀectively limit the number of candidate partitions returned
in the query answers.
5.2 Eﬀect of Diﬀerent Data Distributions
In the second experiment, we study the eﬀect of diﬀerent data distributions. Fig-
ure 4(b) shows the precisions of the various schemes under three diﬀerent distri-
butions: Exponential, Uniform and Gaussian. The precisions of all the schemes
are better with the exponential dataset, because the data generated under the
exponential distribution are clustered toward one corner (the origin) of the data
space, whereas they are more spread out under the other two distributions.
The relative performance of the three schemes remain largely the same as
before: with VRtree performing the best, while VKDtree and Z-ordering exhibit
similar performance. We also note that VRtree is much more eﬀective than
VKDtree and Z-ordering under uniform data distribution.
5.3 Eﬀect of Dataset Sizes
With a ﬁxed data space, the size of the dataset will have an eﬀect on the perfor-
mance of the schemes. In particular, for large datasets, the data space becomes
more densely populated. For a ﬁxed-size query, this means that the precision
will, with high probability, be higher (compared to one with small dataset size).
This intuition is conﬁrmed in our study, as shown in Figure 4(c) which presents
the results for dataset sizes of 1,000,000, 100,000, and 10,000. The relative per-
formance of the various schemes remain largely the same as in the earlier exper-
iments, though VRtree is less aﬀected by the size of the datasets compared to
VKDtree and Z-ordering.
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Fig. 4. Comparative Study
5.4 Eﬀect of Node Capacity
In this study, we examine the eﬀect of node capacity, which determines the max-
imum number of points allowed per partition. Obviously, a larger node capacity
means that it is more likely that more non-answer points are returned (compared
to a smaller node capacity), thus yielding lower precisions. Figure 4(d) shows
the results for node capacities of 30, 50 and 80. From the ﬁgure, we notice that
the precision of all the schemes improve as the node capacity reduces from 80
to 50 and then to 30.
5.5 Client Computation Cost
In this section, we evaluate the overhead of computation cost at the client side in
authenticating the query results. For both VKDtree and VRtree, the client com-
putation cost includes result entry veriﬁcation cost (CRV ), boundary veriﬁcation
cost(CBV ) and signature veriﬁcation cost (CSV ). Figure 5 shows the authenti-
cation overhead of VKD-tree and VR-tree conducted in our experiment, where
the overhead is measured as
client computation cost − processing cost
processing cost
where the processing cost refers to the cost for verifying only answer tuples.
It turns out that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two schemes -
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while VRtree incurs lower cost to verify the answers (lower false drops), it incurs
additional cost to verify the chaining of partitions; whereas VKDtree does not
need to deal with partition chaining but it returns more false drops and hence
incur larger cost to verify the answers.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a mechanism for users to verify that their query
answers on a multi-dimensional dataset are correct. The mechanism follows a
partition-based strategy, and comprises two steps: (a) verify that all partitions
relevant to the query are returned, and (b) verify that all qualifying data points
within each relevant partition are returned. The signature chain technique from
[15] is used to chain up points and partitions so that any malicious omissions can
be detected by the user. We study two schemes: Veriﬁable KD-tree (VKDtree)
that is based on space partitioning, and Veriﬁable R-tree (VRtree) that is based
on data partitioning. The schemes are evaluated on window queries, and results
show that the VRtree is highly precise, meaning that few data points outside of
a query answer are disclosed in the course of proving its correctness.
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